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CASE COMMENTS
which never contemplated a partition deed expressly purporting to
create a tenancy by entireties-said that a partition deed is incapable
of conferring an interest on someone who, although named, had no
prior interest. To apply this rule to these facts is to lose sight of
the goal of litigation and to become enslaved by strict stare decisis.
If John Smith had conveyed the tract, once it had been allotted to
him, to a third party who had reconveyed to the spouses as a unity,
Smith's mother's intent would have been carried out. But more import-
ant, if the court had followed the reasoning of the courts which allow
the creation of estates by the entirety by (i) conveying to one's self and
one's spouse by a joint deed, (2) conveying a one-half undivided in-
terest to one's spouse, where the intent is clear, or (3) merely con-
veying the whole to one's spouse, where the intent is likewise clear,
3 1
the intent of his mother would have been effectuated. In ignoring
the devices used by the courts to facilitate the creation of estates
by the entirety and in adhering adamantly to a rule which, when
stretched to fit the facts of the principal case, leads to an unjust re-
sult, the court sacrificed substance for form.
JOSEPH L. LYLE, JR.
RELEVANCY OF CHARACTER EVIDENCE
ON DAMAGES FOR WRONGFUL DEATH
Plaintiff's decedent was killed as a result of an accident caused
by the negligence of the defendant. Plaintiff, a daughter of the de-
ceased, qualified as administratrix of the estate and brought an action
for wrongful death in the case of Basham v. Terry.' The plaintiff's
evidence, bearing upon the measure of damages, showed that prior
to the accident the decedent, being retired from employment, had
helped with the laundering and cooking at home, had given con-
siderable time to gardening for the family, and had visited his wife
and son in nearby institutions in which they were undergoing treat-
ment.
The defendant then sought to introduce evidence in mitigation of
damages tending to show the conduct, habits, and family relations
of the deceased. Through cross-examination of the plaintiff, another
daughter, and the widow of the deceased, the defendant attempted to
mSee notes 26, 28 and 29 supra and accompanying text.
'199 Va. 817, 102 S.E.2d 285 (1958).
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prove that the deceased was "accustomed to doing some drinking....,2
Further, through the testimony of a clerk of court, the defendant
undertook to introduce evidence that on two occasions the plaintiff
and the wife of the deceased had sworn out warrants against the de-
ceased charging him with physical assault upon the wife. To all of this,
counsel for the plaintiff objected: "Your Honor, I take the position
that any such alleged evidence of his being a worthless bum is irrele-
vant in a case of this kind."3 The trial court sustained the objection
of plaintiff's counsel and excluded the defendant's evidence: "At this
stage of the record, the Court thinks the matter has not been placed
in issue." 4 Judgment against the defendant was entered in the amount
of the statutory maximum, $25,00o.5
The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reversed the trial court
and remanded the case for a new trial.6 In the opinion, the court
reiterated its previous holdings that a jury, in ascertaining damages for
wrongful death, may take into consideration the beneficiaries' loss
of the decedent's care, attention, and society and may award addi-
tiopal sums for solace and comfort for the sorrow, suffering, and
mental anguish occasioned by the death.7 The court held that the ex-
cluded evidence was clearly relevant as revealing the extent of these
elements of damage 8
2Administratrix was questioned by defendant's counsel and answered as fol-
lows:
"Q. As a matter of fact, Miss Terry, your father had been accustomed to doing





rThe statutory maximum has since been raised to $3oooo. Va. Code Ann. §
8-636 (Supp. 1958).
6Basham v. Terry, 199 Va. 817, io2 S.E.2d 285 (1958). The sole ground for re-
versal was the prejudicial result of the trial court's erroneous refusal to admit the
evidence of the character of the deceased. The court found no error in the trial
court's refusal to instruct on the possible contributory negligence of the deceased-
the other ground upon which the defendant had sought reversal.
'E.g., Gough v. Shaner, 197 Va. 572, 9o S.E.2d 17x (1955); Matthews v. Hicks,
x97 Va. 112, 87 S.E.2d 629 (1955); Wolfe v. Lockhart, 195 Va. 479, 78 S.E.2d 654
(1953); Ratcliffe v. McDonald's Adm'r, 123 Va. 871, 97 S.E. 3o7 (1918); Chesapeake
& 0. Ry. v. Ghee's Adm'x, iio Va. 527, 66 S.E. 826 (1910); Pocahontas Collieries Co.
*R. Rukas' Adm'r, 1o4 Va. 278, 51 S.E. 449 ('9o5); Anderson v. Hygeia Hotel Co.,
92 Va. 687, 24 S.E. 269 (1896); Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Noell's Adm'r, 73 Va. (32
Gratt.) 394 (1879); Matthews v. Warner's Adm'r, 70 Va. (29 Gratt.) 570 (1877). See
generally 5 Michie's Jurisprudence of Va. & W. Va. Death by Wrongful Act § 14
(1949).
8rhe court further stated that while the two criminal warrants sworn out
against the decedent were somewhat remote, if the warrants had been tendered they
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The basis of relevancy of the excluded character evidence in
the above case is clear. The approach taken by the plaintiff's counsel
and the reluctance of the trial court to admit the evidence is prob-
ably indicative of a widespread misconception that evidence of a
party's character traits or habits is not admissible even though in fact
it may bear directly on an issue in the case. Such a misconception
must have its basis in the well-recognized rule that evidence of a party's
character as an indication of his conduct on a specific occasion is norm-
ally not admissible.0 For example, in an action for injuries sustained as
a result of an automobile accident, evidence of prior convictions of
the plaintiff for traffic violations would not be admissible as tending
to show contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, because
of the unfair prejudice, and possible unjust condemnation, which
such evidence might induce.'( Consequently, even though character
evidence may have some basis of relevancy, it is held inadmissible be-
cause it is believed that the usefulness of the evidence is greatly out-
weighed by the undue prejudice and confusion which might result in
the minds of the jurors.11
It has long been recognized, however, that where evidence of certain
character traits or habits has a substantial independent basis of
should have been admitted in evidence to show the true relationship between the
deceased and his wife. Basham v. Terry, 199 Va. 817, 102 S.E.2d 285, 291 (1958).
91 Wigmore, Evidence § 64 (3d ed. 1946).
"Nesbit v. Cumberland Contracting Co., 196 Md. 36, 75 A.2d 339, 341 (195o).
%Vigmore says that "a fact may be logically relevant, and thus far admissible, and
yet be excluded by reason of one of the auxiliary principles of policy .... particularly
those of Confusion of Issues, Unfair Surprise, or Undue Prejudice." 1 Wigmore,
Evidence § 29(a) (3d ed. 1940).
"As early as 1864 courts saw the evils of the admission of such evidence: "Many
considerations concur in rejecting such evidence in civil cases. Evidence of this
character has but a remote bearing as proof to show that wrongful acts have or
have not been committed, and the mind resorts to it for aid only when the other evi-
dence is doubtful and nicely balanced. It may then perhaps serve to turn the
wavering scales. Very rarely can it be of substantial use in getting at the truth.
It is uncertain in its nature-both because the true character of a large portion of
mankind is ascertained with difficulty, and because those who are called to testi-
fy are reluctant to disparage their neighbors,--especially if they are wealthy, in-
fl.uential, popular, or even only pleasant and obliging. It is mere matter of opinion,
and in matters of opinion men are apt to be greatly influenced by prejudice, partisan-
ship, or other bias, of which they are unconscious; and in cases which are not quite
clear they are apt to agree with the one who first speaks to them on the subject, or to
form their opinions upon the opinions of others. The introduction of such evidence
in civil causes, wherever character is assailed, would make trials intolerably long
and tedious and greatly increase the expense and delay of litigation. It is a kind
of evidence that might be easily manufactured-is liable to abuse and if in common
use in the courts, as likely to mislead as to guide aright." Wright v. McKee, 37 Vt.
161, 163-64 (1864).
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relevancy-i.e., where the traits or habits tend to prove or disprove
some operative issue in the case other than the alleged conduct of
the party on a specific occasion-the evidence may be admitted for
that purpose. It appears that such character evidence is most fre-
quently admitted upon issues relating to damages. For example,
in a father's action for seduction of his daughter, damages are based
primarily on the loss of the daughter's services. But in addition,
the father is allowed to include compensation for the impairment
of the family- honor and for his own mental suffering; and evidence
of the daughter's actual chaste character is relevant to establish the
extent of his mental suffering.12 By the same reasoning, character
evidence is admissible in actions for criminal conversation, alienation
of affections,13 indecent assault,'4 and breach of promise to marry.' 5
The Basham case is illustrative of another action where evidence
of character is admissible upon issues relating to damages, that is,
the action for wrongful death.16 Under the Virginia rule of damages
for wrongful death, which permits damages to be recovered for loss of
companionship and solace, the independent basis of relevancy for the
admission of character evidence is strong and should present no diffi-
culty. In fact, under the Virginia rule, it seems that almost any ele-
ment of character might be relevant and admissible as bearing on
the loss of companionship and solace. However, the Virginia measure
of damages for wrongful death is almost unique. Only three other
states' 7 expressly allow recovery for sentimental losses.1B
2-1 Wiginore, Evidence § 210 (3d ed. 194o).
2rrhe actual bad character or conduct of a plaintiff may serve in mitigation of
damages inasmuch as the loss of his wife's virtue can mean little to a person of his
behaviour. Id. § 75.
"In a civil action for assault, where the assault is claimed to have been made
for indecent purposes, the actual chaste character of the woman is material as af-
fecting the extent of the injury to her feelings. Id. § 212.
"Evidence of the unchaste character of the promisee of marriage is admissible,
for the disgrace of the promisee would naturally be less or lacking if she were
already unchaste. Id. § 213.
lhWigmore suggests that evidence of character may be admissible in an action
for wrongful death if it can be shown that the evidence sought to be admitted is
material to the inquiry of the measure of damages: "[I]t would seem that the par-
ticular bad acts of a deceased person would be receivable to evidence his moral
character, so far as that character might be material in estimating the damages
payable to next of kin in an action for loss of support due to death by wrongful
act." Id. § 2i0(a).
12Louisiana, South Carolina, and West Virginia appear to be the only states
which adopt the Virginia measure.of damages. McCormick, Damages § 99 nn. 62 and
65 (1935); 16 Am. Jur. Death § 177 n. 3 (1938); Annot., 74 A.L.R. ii (1931).
1'Sentimental losses" is the term adopted in this comment to replace loss
of the decedent's care, attention, and society and damages for the beneficiaries' sor-
row, suffering, and mental anguish occasioned by the death.
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In the majority of jurisdictions recovery of damages for senti-
mental loss is rejected, and recovery is limited to the value of the
pecuniary interest that the beneficiaries had in the life of the de-
ceased: the present value of the net earnings which the deceased
would have accumulated had he lived his normal life expectancy. 9
It would seem that in these states it would be very difficult to overcome
the reluctance of the court to admit character evidence and to es-
tablish an independent basis of relevacy upon which character evi-
dence might be admitted. The logical basis of relevancy of this evi-
dence would be. in reference to the decedent's probable gross income,
living expenses, or similar pecuniary items. Surprisingly few cases have
considered the issue of admissibility of character evidence in this
context, but these same cases have generally allowed such evidence
without specifying the basis of relevancy.2°
In the North Carolina case of Hanks v. Norfolk & W. Ry.,21 the
defendant was permitted to introduce evidence that the decedent had
'The pecuniary relief afforded by the statutes of the various states which govern
wrongful death are of two general types:
(i) Damages based upon loss of contribution to the enumerated relatives de-
termined by the present worth of the contributions and support which the de-
ceased probably would have given to the survivors or beneficiaries had he lived.
McCormick, Damages § 98 (1935); Developments in the Law-Damages-1935-1947,
61 Harv. L. Rev. 113, 167 (1947)-
(2) Damages based on the loss to the estate of the deceased. These damages are
determined in some jurisdictions by the present value of the decedent's probable
future earnings less his probable personal expenses. In other states the damages
are what the deceased would have accumulated or saved out of his earnings, de-
ducting all probable expenditures. In a few jurisdictions the estate may recover the
deceased's total probable earnings with no deductions for expenses. Developments
in the Law-Damages-1935-i94 7 , supra.
-2Taylor v. Western Pac. R.R., 45 Cal. 323, 334 (1873) (evidence of education,
sobriety, and economy admissible to show greater earning capacity than that of an
uneducated, drunken spendthrift); McDonald v. Price, 8o Cal. App. 2d 15o, 181 P.2d
115, 116 (1947) (evidence of habitual intemperance and gambling admissible as
showing value of decedent's life to his family); Pell v. Herbert, 33 Cal. App. 730,
166 Pac. 386, 387 (1917) (evidence of dissolute and unthrifty habits admissible as
measure of damages); Townsend v. Armstrong, 220 Iowa 396, 260 N.W. 17, 20
(1935) (evidence of drunkenness admissible to show effect on earning capacity); Holm-
berg v. Murphy, 167 Minn. 282, 2o8 N.W. 8oS, 8o9 (1926) (evidence of unserved jail
term admissible as bearing upon amount of pecuniary loss); Wolters v. Chicago
& A. Ry., 193 S.W. 877, 879 (Kansas City Ct. App. 1917) (evidence of habitual so-
briety admissible to aid in determining pecuniary loss); Craig v. Boston & Me. R.R.,
92 N.H. 408, 32 A.2d 316, 820 (1943) (evidence of lewd and lascivious conduct admis-
sible as bearing upon amount of probable contribution to children); Umphrey v.
Deery, 78 N.D. 211, 48 N.W.2d 897, 9o9 (1951) (evidence of industry, sobriety and
trustworthiness admissible to show substantial pecuniary loss); Fleming v. City of
Seattle, 45 Wash. 2d 477, 275 P.2d 904, 910 (1954) (evidence of habit of intoxication
admissible to show deceased was less valuable to family).
2123o N.C. 179, 52 S.E.2d 717 (1949).
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previously entered a plea of guilty to a charge of nonsupport of his
two minor children. The court said that the evidence "showed the
neglect and disregard of a parent for his children which had neces-
sarily continued for sometime before he was hailed into court."22 That
statement was made by a cpurt in a state which purports to have as
the measure of damages "the present worth of the net pecuniary value
of the life of the deceased to be ascertained by deducting the probable
cost of his own living and usual and ordinary expenses from the
probable gross income... based upon his life expectancy.
'23 It
seems that this evidence is quite minimal in its effect on the de-
ceased's gross income or on his living expenses, if indeed it is rele-
vant at all. It is rather difficult to understand how the decedent's
treatment of his family might reduce his income or increase his ex-
penses. Such evidence might have a relevancy to the amount of the
decedent's net income which he would have given to the beneficiaries,
but this is not a part of the measure of recovery in North Carolina.
In most states the measure of damages for wrongful death, although
limited to pecuniary loss, is not governed by such a crystallized formu-
la as North Carolina has laid down. In these states some basis for
admission of character evidence has been found. A Washington court
24
admitted evidence tending to show a habit of drinking intoxicants in
mitigation of damages because "such a habit tends to lower a man's
earning capacity, to shorten his expectancy of life, to impair his use-
fulness as a father, and to lessen his protection and support of his
family."25 An Iowa court26 permitted the introduction of evidence
of sober aid industrious habits of a deceased because the evidence
tended to show the value of the services of the decedent and the loss
to his estate caused by his death. A California court27 held the same
type of evidence was relevant as showing "the extent of his probable
usefulness to his beneficiaries."
28
Admitting that there is some basis of relevancy for this evidence
of character, it seems to be so slender that some attempt should have
been made by these courts to rationalize the general rule of evidence
which excludes similar evidence when introduced to prove conduct
on a specific occasion because of the possibility of resulting prejudice
"Id. at 719.
Ol1d. at 723 (dissenting opinion) (citations omitted).
"Lundberg v. Baumgartner, 5 Wash. 2d 6ig, io6 P.2d 566 (1940).
"Id at 567.
WVan Gent v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 8o Iowa 526, 45 N.W. 913 (890).
"rBarboza v. Pacific Portland Cement Co., 162 Cal. 36, i2o Pac. 767 (1912).
2Id. at 770.
